---
title: "Auditing AI browser extensions on Confluence, Notion, Jira & internal intranets."
description: "Why IT and InfoSec teams restrict AI Chrome extensions on internal wikis (Confluence, Notion, Jira, SharePoint) and how activeTab-only extensions comply."
canonical_url: "https://vezz.me/permissions/internal-company-wikis-and-intranets/"
type: "pseo-permissions"
category: "permissions"
topic: "Enterprise Wiki Security Audit"
intent: "Best for enterprise IT administrators, CISOs, engineering managers, and employees reviewing AI extension compliance on company intranets."
---

# Auditing AI browser extensions on Confluence, Notion, Jira & internal intranets.

Why IT and InfoSec teams restrict AI Chrome extensions on internal wikis (Confluence, Notion, Jira, SharePoint) and how activeTab-only extensions comply.

> **Best fit:** Best for enterprise IT administrators, CISOs, engineering managers, and employees reviewing AI extension compliance on company intranets.

## Technical Permission Audit

- **Manifest Key:** `activeTab (Enterprise Intranet Posture)`
- **Chrome Install Warning:** None (scoped strictly to the user-triggered tab)
- **Risk Level:** Lower

```json
// manifest.json
{
  "name": "Vezz me",
  "permissions": ["activeTab", "storage"]
  // Zero internal host permissions (e.g. *.atlassian.net, *.notion.so, 10.0.0.0/8)
}
```

### Legitimate Uses
- Explaining unfamiliar internal architecture diagrams, legacy code snippets, or incident postmortems in Confluence
- Deconstructing complex Jira acceptance criteria and compliance tickets in place
- Synthesizing lengthy Notion product requirements documents (PRDs) into 3-bullet executive briefs

### Red Flags to Watch For
- Extensions demanding `<all_urls>` that passively scrape internal wiki pages in the background
- Extensions that send full DOM trees containing proprietary trade secrets or customer PII to training pools
- Extensions with unknown corporate ownership or frequent change-of-control ownership transfers

**How Vezz me handles this:** Vezz me has zero passive background access to your internal wiki. It cannot read any intranet or Confluence page unless an employee highlights a specific passage and explicitly presses Ctrl+Shift+X. Only the highlighted text is processed, and user inputs are never used to train models.

## Step-by-step workflow

1. **Audit enterprise browser extension policy**: InfoSec teams block `<all_urls>` extensions because they can passively harvest proprietary architecture docs, source code, and employee records from internal wikis.
2. **Demonstrate activeTab boundary isolation**: Show your IT administrator Vezz me's manifest: with only `activeTab` and `storage`, the browser enforces that the extension cannot access internal wiki URLs in the background.
3. **Highlight only non-confidential technical passages**: Use Vezz me to decode generic technical patterns (e.g., regexes, SQL queries, or public framework docs embedded in internal wikis) safely.

## Why CISOs block AI sidebars on enterprise intranets

Many commercial AI extensions inject scrapers that send entire webpage HTML trees back to their servers for indexing.

- Intranet pages often contain customer PII, unannounced financials, API tokens, and private security postmortems
- Vezz me sends ONLY the specific text snippet you highlight—never the full page DOM or surrounding intranet forms
- Runs with the narrowest possible permission footprint on Chrome and Firefox

## Enterprise Wiki Safety Comparison

Comparing Vezz me with typical AI sidebar extensions on internal wikis.

| Security Dimension | Vezz me | Typical AI Sidebar Extension |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Background Access to Internal Confluence / Jira | Zero access (blocked by browser activeTab sandbox) | Granted 24/7 across all authenticated corporate tabs |
| Data Ingestion Scope | Only the exact highlighted text snippet | Scrapes entire HTML DOM and URL paths |
| Model Training Policy | User queries are never used to train AI models | Free tiers frequently opt users into model training |

## Frequently asked questions

### Can our company deploy Vezz me via Google Workspace Chrome Enterprise policy?

Yes! Chrome Enterprise admins can whitelist Vezz me's extension ID in the Google Admin console (`chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/...`).

### Does Vezz me store our internal wiki text?

No. Highlights are processed ephemerally to generate the answer and are never retained for model retraining.

### Where can I read our Google Docs & Workspace security audit?

See our related guide: Google Docs & Workspace Permission Audit.

## Related guides

- [Google Docs & Workspace Permission Audit](https://vezz.me/permissions/google-docs-and-workspace/): Why activeTab is essential on enterprise document platforms.
- [GitHub & Source Code Privacy Audit](https://vezz.me/permissions/github-and-source-code-privacy/): Protecting proprietary code repositories from extension scraping.
- [AI Chrome Extension Permission Checker](https://vezz.me/ai-chrome-extension-permission-checker/): Audit any extension before approving it for your enterprise.
- [Banking & Financial Sites Permission Audit](https://vezz.me/permissions/banking-and-financial-sites/): Security guarantees around sensitive institutional portals.